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THE ILLUSION OF DEVIL'S ADVOCACY: HOW THE
JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT FORESHADOW
THEIR DECISIONS DURING ORAL ARGUMENT
Sarah Levien Shullman*

INTRODUCTION

The common perception about oral arguments in the United
States Supreme Court is that they are colorful, entertaining, and
for the lawyer who happens to be arguing at that moment,
appellate
But
many
nerve-racking.
overwhelmingly
all
useful,2
are
at
oral
arguments
whether
practitioners question
and some explicitly argue that the Justices' decisions are
preordained. 3 They believe that oral argument today is a mere
* Sarah Shullman, a magna cum laude graduate of the Georgetown University Law Center,
is an associate at Steel Hector & Davis LLP in West Palm Beach, Florida, where she
practices in the areas of general civil, commercial, and products liability litigation.
Although the conclusions and opinions expressed in this article are hers alone, Ms.
Shullman would like to thank Professor Richard J. Lazarus of Georgetown for suggesting
the topic and providing a thoughtful critique that significantly improved the quality of her
research.
1. See Stephen M. Shapiro, Oral Argument In The Supreme Court Of The United

States 8, available at http://www.appellate.net/articles/oralargsc.asp (accessed Sept. 15,
2004; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process) ("Questions from the
bench come in all forms and varieties. They range from the difficult to the obvious, from
the subtle to the whimsical. The variety, rapidity, and unpredictability of questioning from
the bench is perhaps the distinguishing hallmark of oral argument before the nine Justices
of the Supreme Court.").
2. See Rex E. Lee, Oral Argument In The Supreme Court, 72 A.B.A. J. 60, 60 (June

1986) ("The first question that must be asked about oral argument in the Supreme Court or
anywhere else is how much good it does-that is, how much it affects the outcome of the
case. My answer to that question is a confident 'I don't know."').
3. See David G. Savage, Say the Right Thing, 83 A.B.A. J. 54, 55-56 (Sept. 1997)
("When pressed on the issue, Thomas has told clerks that he relies on the briefs and sees no
need to quiz the lawyers, and that he thinks oral arguments are overrated. They may make
for a good show, but they are not altogether significant in the outcome. Thomas may well
be right.").
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formality, designed at a minimum to help the Court write a
better opinion, although it can sometimes be used to "clarify
facts and to test the vulnerability of tentative theories and
approaches." 4
But whether oral arguments are useful in the sense of being
able to sway one or more of the Justices' votes, most practicing
Supreme Court advocates agree on one proposition: No matter
how well or poorly the argument goes, one simply cannot tell
from their questions how the Justices are going to vote.5 This
article challenges that view, and suggests that oral arguments
have more predictive value-and are thus more useful-than
most people think.
My research indicates that by keeping track of the number
of questions each Justice asks, and by evaluating the relative
content of those questions, one can actually predict before the
argument is over which way each Justice will vote.6 This article
also challenges the theory that the Justices use their questions to
pull out the strongest and weakest points of each side equally, by
showing that in the arguments I observed, they played devil's
advocate much more often toward the parties with whom they
disagreed than they did toward the parties they supported.
Part One of this article establishes the methodology I used
to analyze the Justices' questions-specifically their content,
tone, and number. Part Two summarizes my findings about oral
arguments in the Supreme Court as a whole and suggests that
predicting the outcome in a particular case may actually be
possible. Part Three analyzes the questioning style and
tendencies of each Justice. Finally, Part Four reports my
predictions in three then-undecided cases, and, as a means of
4. Lee, supra n. 2, at 60.
5. See Savage, supra n. 3, at 60 ("Most attorneys say they leave Supreme Court oral
arguments enthused by the experience, but many emerge uncertain about the outcome.");
Lee, supra n. 2, at 60 ("It should not be inferred, however, that comments in oral argument
always reflect the justices' views. In the case of some members of the present Court, what
you see and hear at oral argument is what you get at the conference vote. In other cases, it
is not."); William Funk, Supreme Court News, 26 Admin. & Reg. L. News 8, 9 (Winter
2001) ("However, as many commentators remind us, the expressions at oral argument are
an uncertain basis for predicting Supreme Court outcomes.").
6. The reader should bear in mind that my conclusions are based on the limited
information that I was able to gather while attending only ten oral arguments during the
October 2002 Term. Accordingly, one should not generalize my results without
undertaking further research.
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testing my theory, I compare my predictions to the actual
outcomes.
I. METHODOLOGY

I attended ten oral arguments at the Supreme Court during
the October 2002 Term. Using the methodology described
below, I tracked all of the questions asked from the bench. After
the first seven of those ten cases were decided, I compared the
content and tone of the Justices' questions in those cases to their
decisions in each. This analysis allowed me to develop a theory
about the predictive value of oral argument, which I then tested
by predicting the outcomes in the three cases that had not yet
been decided, and comparing my predictions to the actual
results.7
A. Tracking the Questions
During oral argument, I recorded every question and noted
which Justice asked it. 8 Next, I assigned a score to each question
based on its content, using a scale of one (the most helpful
questions) to five (the most hostile). For example, a one was
assigned if the Justice asked a question that was designed to
elicit the lawyer's best argument. Thus, helpful questions that
began with: "Aren't you really trying to say that.. .," if the
lawyer really was trying to say that, would be given a one or a
two. A five, on the other hand, was assigned to very hostile or
argumentative questions. For example, a statement that began
with: "I just don't see how your argument could possibly be
7. While my methods were not scientifically exact, they were consistently applied to
each argument. If there was any uncertainty about the content or tone of a particular
question, it was excluded from my analysis. Likewise, if there was any uncertainty about
which Justice was speaking, those questions were also excluded. (The non-credentialed
press section, where I sat during oral arguments, is on the far left side of the courtroom,
behind large marble columns. From these seats, you cannot always tell who is speaking
unless you know the voices of all the Justices.)
8. These notations were necessary because up until October Term 2004, oralargument transcripts did not indicate which Justice asked each question. See Assoc. Press,
High Court to Name Names, available at http://www.nusd.kl2.az.us/nhs/gthomson.class/
articles/judicial ("For decades, transcripts listed 'Question' without identifying the
questioner.") (accessed Dec. 20, 2004; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process).
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correct," would receive a five. A three was assigned to
completely neutral questions, or questions meant only to clarify
a particular fact or minor point.
I also tallied the number of questions each Justice asked,
dividing them into categories: (1) questions asked in total; (2)
questions asked per case; (3) questions asked of the party with
which the Justice sided in the final decision; and (4) questions
asked of the party against which the Justice sided in the final
decision. To clarify, my observations show, for example, that
many Justices asked far more questions of the respondent in
cases in which they ultimately decided against the respondent's
position.
In addition, I made notations about the Justices' tones of
voice, when they made jokes, how often they used hypotheticals,
and any other potentially relevant or interesting observations
that occurred to me during the oral arguments. (These notes
were not given scores, but I referred to them when preparing
Part III of this article, in which I analyze the styles of the
individual Justices.)
B. Analyzing the Questions
After seven of the cases were decided, I entered the
questions from all of the arguments and their corresponding
scores into a spreadsheet. I tallied the numbers and calculated
averages for categories such as how many questions each Justice
asked per case; which Justice asked the most questions overall;
how hostile or helpful each Justice's questions were on average;
and how many questions were asked of one party when the
Justice ultimately decided for (or against) that party, and
whether those questions were hostile or helpful. I also compared
the authors of the seven decided opinions to the Justices who
asked the most and fewest (and most hostile and helpful)
questions in those cases, to see if these factors seemed to play
any role in the opinion assignments. 9 Finally, I searched for
patterns in the data, essentially exploring the predictive value of
the Justices' questions in hindsight. I then applied the theory I
9. Because opinions are assigned by the senior Justice in the majority based on a
myriad of factors, some perhaps impossible to divine, an analysis of the likelihood of a
particular Justice's being assigned a particular opinion is beyond the scope of this paper.
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derived from the results of that analysis to predict the outcomes
in the three remaining cases.
II. BRIEF SUMMARY OF CASES OBSERVED

1. The Seven Decided Cases
In Yellow Transportation,Inc. v. Michigan,l0 the issue was
whether, under the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency
Act of 1991,11 only a state's generic fee is relevant to
determining the fee that it should have collected or charged as of
November 15, 1991.12 The Court reversed and remanded,
holding that states may not modify a reciprocity agreement to
alter any fee charged or collected as of that date.1 The Court
held that because the ICC's interpretation of the fee-cap
provision was a permissible reading of the statute and
reasonably resolved any ambiguities, it should have received
Court
deference under Chevron,14 and the Michigan Supreme
5
erred in declining to enforce the ICC' s interpretation.'
In Federal Communications Commission v. NextWave
Personal Communications, Inc.,16 the Court considered whether
section 525 of the Bankruptcy Code 17 prohibits the FCC from
revoking licenses held by a debtor upon the debtor's failure to
make timely payments for their purchase. The Court held that
the FCC is prohibited under the express language of section 525
from revoking licenses, finding that whether the FCC had a
motive for attempting to revoke them is
valid regulatory
18
irrelevant.

10. 537 U.S. 36 (2002).
11. 49 U. S. C. § 11506(c)(2)(B)(iv)(III) (1994), amended and recodified in 49 U.S.C.
§ 14504(c)(2)(B)(iv)(III) (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
12.
13.
14.
15.

Yellow Trans., 537 U.S. at 44.
See id at 45-48.
Chevron USA, Inc. v. Nat. Resources Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Yellow Trans., 537 U.S. at 48.

16. 537 U.S. 293 (2003).
17. 11 U.S.C. § 525 (2003) (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
18. NextWave, 537 U.S. at 301-02.

276
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Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co. 19 posed the question of
whether the Commissioner of Social Security's failure as of
October 1, 1993, to assign responsibility for eligible retired coal
miners to the signatory operators that employed them voids the
miners' benefits. The Court held that despite their untimeliness,
initial assignments made after October 1, 1993, are valid.20
In a more prominent case, Eldred v. Ashcroft,21 the Court
considered whether the twenty-year term extension set forth in
the Copyright Term Extension Act of 199822 violates either the
Copyright Clause or the First Amendment. 23 In a muchanticipated decision, the Court upheld the CTEA.24
The issue in United States v. Bean2 5 was whether a federal
district court has authority to exempt a convicted felon from the
blanket prohibition against possessing firearms,2 6 when annual
appropriations limitations from Congress prevent the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms from processing applications for
such exemptions. The Court held that absent an actual denial by
ATF of a felon'spetition, judicial review is precluded under 18
U.S.C. § 925(c). 2 7In Miller-El v. Cockrell,2 8 the issue was whether the Court
of Appeals erred in evaluating the petitioner's claim under
Batson v. Kentucky,2 9 and denying him a certificate of
appealability (COA). In an eight-to-one opinion sharply
criticizing the lower federal and Texas courts, the Court held
that deference by federal judges to state-court decisions does not
by definition preclude relief, and that the Fifth Circuit erred in
collapsing review of the petitioner's COA request into an
analysis of the merits of the case. 30 A prisoner seeking a COA

19.
20.
21.
22.
U.S.C.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

537 U.S. 149 (2003).
Id. at 172.
537 U.S. 186 (2003).
Pub. L. 105-298, § 102(b) and (d), 112 Stat. 2827-2828 (1998) (amending 17
§§ 302, 304).
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 198.
Id. at 218 (addressing Copyright Clause), 221-22 (addressing First Amendment).
537 U.S. 71 (2002).
See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (available at http://www.uscode.house.gov).
Bean, 537 U.S. at 78.
537 U.S. 322 (2003).
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336-37.
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need only demonstrate "a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right." 31
Finally, in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue32 the Court
considered whether a party seeking an injunction under the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 must prove that the
defendant's use of a similar mark caused it economic harm. The
Court unanimously decided for the petitioner, holding that the
Act requires proof of actual dilution, and that there was
insufficient evidence
33 in this case to support summary judgment
for the respondent.
2. The Three Test Cases34
36
35
Both Ewing v. California and Lockyer v. Andrade
addressed the constitutionality of California's three-strikes law,
and whether imposing a twenty-five-years-to-life prison term for
a third-strike conviction violates the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment when the third
strike is petty theft. The Supreme Court upheld the three-strikes
law in two five-to-four opinions.37
In Norfolk & Western Railway Company v. Ayers,38 the
petitioner alleged that it was error for the court below to (1)
award emotional distress damages for fear of cancer under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act 39 to retirees who were
suffering from asbestosis, but who presented no evidence of
additional physical symptoms that resulted from their fear of
cancer; and (2) not apportion damages among the defendants.
The Court affirmed, holding first that a railroad worker may
recover emotional-distress damages for the fear of developing
cancer, and second, that FELA expressly allows a worker to

31. Id.at 327 (quoting 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(2)).
32. 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
33. Id. at 433-34.
34. These cases were decided in March 2003, but I analyzed them when they were still
pending in order to use my theory to predict their outcomes. Part Five of this Article
compares my predictions to the actual decisions.
35. 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
36. 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
37. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 31; Andrade, 538 U.S. at 77.
38. 538 U.S. 135 (2003).
39. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
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recover his entire damages from any one of the entities whose
negligence jointly caused an injury, thus placing the burden of
seeking contribution from the other defendants on the railroad
funding the worker's recovery. 40
III. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

41

Overall, Justice Ginsburg asked the most questions,
whereas Justices Thomas and O'Connor asked the fewest.
However, while Justice Ginsburg spoke most often, she was
usually the least hostile. Justice Breyer asked the most hostile
questions of all the Justices, and he was, on average, equally
hostile to both parties.
All nine of the Justices asked more hostile questions than
they did helpful questions. However, their questions were less
hostile (and sometimes even helpful, depending on the Justice)
when posed to the party who would eventually prevail. While
this may seem obvious, it is not always clear whether a Justice is
playing devil's advocate by asking one party a hostile or
argumentative question, or if he or she really disagrees with that
party's position. Thus, each question must be analyzed
individually.
All nine Justices seemed to ask fewer total questions of the
party in whose favor they would ultimately decide. For example,
Bean was unanimously decided in favor of the petitioner, yet the
Justices asked more questions of the respondent. In NextWave,
they asked almost twice as many questions of the petitioner, and
the decision was eight-to-one in favor of the respondent. The
one exception was Moseley, in which the Justices asked slightly
fewer questions of the respondent, but unanimously held for the
petitioner.
The Justices' questions were also more hostile than helpful
overall, with an average score of 3.38 (three being neutral, five

40. Ayers, 538 U.S. at 157 (addressing fear-of-cancer claim), 165-66 (addressing joint
and several liability).
41. Note that these findings do not account for oral arguments in which the Solicitor
General (or a Deputy or Assistant Solicitor General) argued on behalf of the United States.
However, it is important to note that the Justices' questions often increase in number and
hostility when they are addressed to the Solicitor General. My numbers may in
consequence be skewed in cases in which the United States was a party or an amicus.
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most hostile) for questions asked of both parties. On average,

however, they asked much more hostile questions of the parties
against whom they would ultimately decide-3.80 for the losing
parties compared to an average score of 2.87 for the winning
parties. For example, in Bean, whereas the respondent's
questions scored a 3.90, the'petitioner faced questions with an
average content score of 2.67, and it was the petitioner who
ultimately prevailed. In NextWave, the petitioner faced mostly
hostile questions with an average score of 3.78, whereas the
respondent faced mostly helpful questions with an average score
of 2.77; the decision was eight-to-one in favor of the respondent.
The exception again was Moseley, in which the petitioner's and
respondent's questions had average content scores of 3.32 and
3.20 respectively, although the Court unanimously decided in
favor of the petitioner.
In many instances, the Justice asking the most questions
wrote the opinion for the majority. The two exceptions were
Yellow Transportation, in which Justice O'Connor asked the
fewest questions, but wrote the opinion for the Court, and Bean,
in which Justice Thomas asked no questions, but wrote for a
unanimous Court.
IV. THE JUSTICES

A. Justice Breyer
Justice Breyer will tell you in no uncertain terms what
bothers him about your case, especially in slippery-slope
situations:
I mean, in 1976, Congress extended the term from 28 years,

renewable once, to life of the author plus 50 years. Now
they're extending it life of the author plus 70. If the latter is
unconstitutional on your theory, how could the former not
be? And if the 42
former is, the chaos that would ensue would

be horrendous.

42. Transcr. of Oral Argument at 6-7, Eldred v. Ashcrofi, 537 U.S. 186 (2003)
(considering effects of holding 1976 copyright extensions unconstitutional) (available at
2002 WL 31309203).
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Or,
When the people who really get the cancer come into court,
the cupboard will be bare, and I think that's a serious policy
problem, and it's worrying me quite a lot, and
43 that's why I
keep coming back to the open nature of this.
Justice Breyer is fairly quiet when he agrees with the party
speaking; however, when addressing the party he will ultimately
decide against, his questioning can be brutal. On average he
asked almost three times as many questions of the party whose
position he opposed, and in NextWave, he asked five times as
writing a
many questions of the respondent, ultimately
44
dissenting opinion in favor of the petitioner.
Justice Breyer, like Justice Scalia, often uses hypotheticals
to test the limits of an advocate's argument. As most
experienced Supreme Court practitioners can attest, his
hypotheticals often digress to the bounds of relevancy and yet
they manage to convey his point rather precisely:
Justice Breyer: -but I learned the second year of law
school, I learned the second year of law school-and
obviously many of my colleagues don't agree with me, but
I learned the second year of law school that when you have
a text which says "all," that there are often implied, notwritten exceptions. All animals in the park. No animals in
the park doesn't necessarily apply to a pet oyster, okay, and
soJustice Scalia: Well, it's not an animal.
Justice Breyer: Thank you. An oyster in my course in
biology is an animal, all right. (Laughter)
Justice Breyer: Maybe in yours it was a rock, or a
vegetable or a mineral. But regardless, you see my point,
and my question, of course, is that since that's how I read
statutes-not everybody-is that I find exceptions implicit
in statutes where to fail to read that exception is to destroy
the purpose of the statute .... 45
43. Transcr. of Oral Argument at 44, Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135 (2003)
(speculating about what would happen if all persons afraid of getting cancer from asbestos
were compensated for their fears) (available at 2002 WL 31497282).
44. NextWave, 537 U.S. at 310-21 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
45. Transcr. of Oral Argument at 28, F.C.C.v. NextWave Personal Commun., Inc., 537
U.S. 293 (2003) (available at 2002 WL 31309185).
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In general, Justice Breyer rarely asks helpful questions. He
will take the problem that concerns him about each side's
argument and try to hash it out with the lawyer giving the
argument. On average, he asked the most hostile questions of all
the Justices, earning a score of 4.0. One major difference
between Justice Breyer and the other Justices is that he will ask
equally hostile questions of both sides. He averaged a score of
4.0 for questions he asked of both successful and unsuccessful
parties. Thus, the one way to predict how Justice Breyer might
decide a case is not by judging the content of his questions, but
by judging the number of them.
B. Justice Ginsburg
Justice Ginsburg asks the most questions out of all the
Justices, and she asks, on average, 1.65 times as many questions
of the party she opposes than of the party she supports. In Bean,
she asked 3.5 times the number of questions of the respondent
than she did of the petitioner, ultimately joining the unanimous
majority opinion in favor of the petitioner.
Justice Ginsburg also asks the least hostile questions on
average, with many helpful questions in the mix. While she asks
mostly helpful questions of the party she agrees with, Justice
Ginsburg will not hesitate to switch sides and ask a hostile
question of that same party or a helpful question of the party
whose position she opposes. For example, in Yellow
Transportation, while she ultimately decided for the petitioner,
she did not hesitate to challenge its lawyer:
But you're suggesting there's a possibility that somebody
would be46 penalized for early payment, for prompt
payment.

This might make Justice Ginsburg, along with Justice Souter,
one of the most objective questioners on the bench, but her
questions are still 1.5 times more hostile when posed to the party
she opposes.
While Justice Ginsburg is difficult to predict because she
asks many questions of both sides, you can usually tell where
46. Transcr. of Oral Argument at 22, Yellow Transp., Inc. v. Mich., 537 U.S. 36 (2002)
(available at 2002 WL 31309187).
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she is leaning by how helpful or hostile her questions are. She
asks questions scoring 2.40 of the party she supports, compared
to questions scoring 3.79 of the party she opposes.
C. Justice Kennedy
Justice Kennedy does not stand out as being very
predictable. He asks the most neutral questions out of all the
Justices when he agrees with a party (3.0), and he asks questions
with only an average level of hostility of the party whose
position he opposes (4.0). Next to Justice Ginsburg, he asks the
most neutral questions overall with an average score of 3.17.
Many of them are clarifying or informational questions:
Well, perhaps I misunderstood. I thought the whole thrust
of your argument was that there is a great First Amendment
47
force here that's being silenced, that's being thwarted.
Next to the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia, Justice
Kennedy asks almost the same number of questions of the party
whose position he opposes as he does of the favored party, by a
ratio of 1.3 to 1. But two cases revealed a slight increase in
Justice Kennedy's questioning. In Miller-El, he asked twice as
many questions of the respondent, ultimately writing the
majority opinion in favor of the petitioner, and in NextWave, he
asked five times more questions of the petitioner, ultimately
joining the majority opinion in favor of the respondent.
Justice Kennedy asks only slightly more hostile questions
of the party he will decide against than he does of the party he
favors, with average scores of 4.0 and 3.0, respectively. For
example, in Yellow Transportation,he posed questions with an
average content of 4.0 to both the petitioner and the respondent.
Overall, it is very difficult to determine the slant of many of
the questions that Justice Kennedy asks. However, probably the
best way to predict a Kennedy decision is by analyzing both the
content and number of his questions, as combining the scores
from these categories seemed to be much more revealing than
was assessing either category alone.

47. Eldred Transcr., supra n. 42, at 8.
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D. Justice 0 'Connor
Next to Justice Thomas, Justice O'Connor is the quietest
member of the Court. She asked almost three times fewer
questions than Justice Ginsburg did. However, she asked three
and a half times more questions of the parties she decided
against than of the parties she ultimately supported. In Eldred,
for example, she asked five times more questions of the
petitioner before joining the majority in favor of the respondent.
Of all the Justices, Justice O'Connor asks the fewest
questions when she supports a party. Her record over ten
arguments also exhibits the largest discrepancy between the
number of questions she asks when she supports a party and the
number of questions she asks when she does not. For example,
in Barnhart, Justice O'Connor ultimately joined the dissenting
opinion favoring the respondent's position, and she asked the
petitioner six times more questions than she asked the
respondent.
Justice O'Connor falls somewhere in the middle when her
questions are evaluated on the basis of content. She ranks fifth
overall in hostility or argumentativeness, third in asking helpful
questions of the party she supports, and sixth in asking hostile
questions of the party she opposes. For example, in Peabody
Coal she asked the petitioner (against whom she decided):
Counsel, would you explain to us the real world
consequences at the end of the day for the respective
positions of the parties? Apparently the miners will be
covered one way or another.
In other words, her questions are neither very hostile nor very
helpful. Justice O'Connor asked few questions overall in Yellow
Transportation, and while her questions were only 1.25 times
more hostile of the respondent, she ultimately wrote the majority
opinion for the Court in favor of the petitioner.
On average, Justice O'Connor was fairly predictable. She
posed questions with an average score of 2.50 to the party she
supported, and questions with an average score of 3.67 to the
party she opposed. The best way to predict an O'Connor

48. Transcr. of Oral Argument at 20, Barnhart v. Peabody Coal, 537 U.S. 149 (2003)
(available at 2002 WL 31309196).
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decision, however, is by calculating the number of questions she
asks: The party facing the fewest questions from Justice
O'Connor is almost sure to have her vote.
E. ChiefJustice Rehnquist
Surprisingly, the Chief Justice is the third quietest member
of the Court. He is also only the fourth most hostile questioner,
with an average score of 3.43.
The Chief Justice tends to ask approximately the same
number of questions of both parties, and the questions he asks of
the party whose position he opposes are only 1.25 times more
hostile than the questions he asks of the party he supports. In
NextWave, he asked the petitioner (against whom he decided):
But this doesn't sound at all like the question presented,
which says at auction, automatically cancel upon the
winning bidder's failure to make timely payments to fulfill
its winning bid. It-when you were drafting that question,
it sounds like your Perception of the thing was quite
different than it is now. 49
Although his questions of the unsuccessful party are
generally more hostile, on average the Chief Justice asks as
many questions of the party whose position he supports as he
does of the party whose position he opposes. For example, in
Peabody Coal, he asked five times more questions of the
petitioner, even though he joined the majority opinion in its
favor, while in NextWave, he asked four times the number of
questions of the petitioner before joining the majority's opinion
in favor of the respondent. And in Yellow Transportation, the
Chief Justice was more hostile to the petitioner when he in fact
joined the majority's decision in its favor.
The Chief Justice has been known to add a little humor to
his intense interrogations:

49. NextWave Transcr., supra n. 45, at 9-10. While the Chief Justice's question was
only moderately hostile, the other Justices were much less forgiving about the petitioner's
shift in views. See e.g. id at 13 ("Justice Scalia:That is not one of the questions presented.
I frankly don't want to decide that question, because that is not one of the things I've given
a lot of attention to. It sounds to me very, you know, at least quite arguable whether they
ought to have that authority.").
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Mr. Wallace, our records reflect that this is your 157th
argument before the Court... I extend to you our
appreciation for your many years of quality advocacy and
dedicated service in the Solicitor's Office-Solicitor
General's Office-on behalf of the United States. That
doesn't mean
we're going to rule in your favor.
50
(Laughter).
But overall, without already knowing his stance on
particular issues (such as copyright law or miners' benefits), an
observer evaluating only his style of questioning might find the
Chief Justice to be one of the least predictable members of the
Court.
F. Justice Scalia
Justice Scalia is by far the most colorful questioner. And
while he asks the second highest number of questions, behind
only Justice Ginsburg, his are easily the most entertaining.
Justice Scalia could also be called the "hypothetical king,"
taking the issue in a given case and twisting it just enough so
that even the most experienced Supreme Court advocates have
trouble with it:
Question: Well now, wait a minute. You say when they do
ask the same questions and they ask them in a way that's
acknowledged to be different, that seems like a
contradiction just starting out.
Mr. Waxman: I think I-I managed to confuse even myself.
51

Question: Good. (Laughter.).
He also tends to be the most humorous:
Mr. Denvir: And in fact, if anything, Mr. Ewing seemed to
be doing everything he can to be-to get out of there
undetected, if that-if you look at the facts of this
crime....

50. Transcr. of Oral Argument at 15-16, Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S.
418 (2003) (available at 2002 WL 31643067); see also David J. Bederman, A Chilly
Reception at the Court, 5 J. App. Prac. & Process 51, 58 (2003) (quoting from oralargument transcript in Smith v. U.S., 507 U.S. 197 (1993)).
51. Transcr. of Oral Argument at 16, Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003)
(available at 2002 WL 31415973).
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Question: I'm curious about one thing. Was he really a very

tall man, or were these irons rather than wood?
(Laughter).52
Justice Scalia asks almost the same number of questions of
each party, but his questions can be extremely hostile when he is
concerned, or has doubts, about a particular proposition. He is
almost twice as hostile to the unsuccessful party as he is to the
party in whose favor he will decide. But while he does tend to
play devil's advocate with the party he supports, Justice Scalia
can often be quite helpful to that party as well.
As an example of Justice Scalia's style, note that in
NextWave he asked by far the most questions of both sides,
ultimately writing the opinion in favor of the respondent.
Predictive of his decision in that case, he asked questions with a
content score of 2.50 for the respondent, versus 4.00 for the
petitioner. In this sense, even if one doesn't know where he
stands on a given issue, Justice Scalia is fairly easy to predict.
G. Justice Souter

Justice Souter falls in the middle as far as the number of
questions he asks at argument, ranking fifth between Justices
Breyer and Kennedy. Overall, Justice Souter asks the third most
hostile questions.
Justice Souter stands out as having the widest range. For
example, he asks questions that are almost two times more
hostile of the party he does not support than of the party he does,
with scores of 4.17 and 2.25, respectively. When he is
questioning a party he supports, Justice Souter asks the most
helpful questions of all the Justices.
For example, in Yellow

Transportation, in which he

ultimately decided for the petitioner, Justice Souter asked the
petitioner questions with an average score of 1.50, versus 4.50
for the respondent:
Question: Let's assume the statute isn't as clear as-as you
are arguing that it is. Isn't this the point at which you say, if
it's not that clear, Chevron controls the answer?
52. Transcr. of Oral Argument at 30, Ewing v. Cal., 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (available at
2002 WL 31525401) (pondering how the petitioner was able to fit the stolen golf clubs into
his pants).
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Mr. Rothfeld:
That-that is absolutely correct, Justice
53
Souter.
And as the above analysis indicates, he can be very hostile
to the party whose position he opposes:
Question: So are you telling me that the answer to my
question is yes? There is only one category known in
Michigan and that is the category of a truck?
Mr. Casey: No. There-there-there's a fee of $10 or 0.
Some trucks were charged 10. Some were charged 0.
Question: So there are at least two categories.
Mr. Casey: Yes.
Question: And if there are at least two categories, don't you
have to do just what Justice Scalia said you have to do?
You have to read something into the statute, or you would
be reading it in such a way as to charge against a truck in
category A what, under the Michigan law, you would have
charged
against a truck for category B. That can't be
54
right.
Additionally, Justice Souter asks on average almost two
times the number of questions of the party whose position he
opposes than of the party whose position he supports. In Bean,
he asked five times the number of questions of the respondent,
when he ultimately decided for the petitioner. In NextWave, he
asked four times the number of questions of the respondent
before joining the majority's opinion in favor of the petitioner.
While Barnhart presented a closer case for predicting
Justice Souter's decision, he ultimately wrote the majority
opinion in favor of the petitioner. In most cases, the best way to
predict a Souter decision is to look at the number and content of
his questions in combination.
H. Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens ranks third in the number of questions
asked per argument, behind Justices Ginsburg and Scalia. Justice
Stevens asks equally helpful and hostile questions of both sides,

53. Yellow Transp. Transcr., supra n. 46, at 13 (addressing petitioner).
54. Id. at 32 (addressing respondent).
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with a score of 3.33 for the party whose position he supports and
3.25 for the party whose position he does not support. He is the
only Justice who, on average, asked more helpful questions of
the party against whom he ultimately decided.
In Yellow Transportation, his average questions of the
respondent scored 2.50 in content, compared to 3.67 for the
petitioner, and yet he concurred in the Court's decision in favor
of the petitioner:
Could I ask on that question? The-the point is it should
not exceed the fee that was charged. If in the aggregate the
change from the place of determining which State applies,
if the aggregate were to decrease the collections, which
theoretically it could be, then 55there would be no violation of
the statute, as I understand it.
In NextWave, however, in which he wrote a concurring
opinion in support of the respondent, Justice Stevens asked four
times as many questions of the petitioner than he asked of the
respondent, and they were 1.3 times more hostile than the
questions he posed to the respondent:
[Y]ou've said two different things there. If it's automatic, it
happened without whatever happened next. But you're
saying56it automatically canceled after attempts to collect
failed.
Surprisingly, Justice Stevens ranks second behind Justice
Breyer in asking the most hostile questions overall, although
because he directs these questions at both sides equally, this
makes him somewhat more difficult to predict than the other
Justices. However, Justice Stevens asks twice as many questions
of the party he opposes as of the party he supports, which puts
him in third place out of the nine Justices in this category.
Overall, Justice Stevens ranks near Justice Kennedy in
being fairly difficult to predict. However, like Justice Breyer,
Justice Stevens seems to ask fewer total questions of the party
he will eventually support, and thus this is one useful variable
for predicting his decision in a given case.

55. Id. at 48 (addressing petitioner).
56. NextWave Transcr., supra n. 45, at 10 (addressing petitioner).
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I. Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas is, as most lawyers know, the quietest
member of the Court. In fact, he did not ask a single question in
the ten arguments I attended. Yet, once in a while when it is
important to him, Justice Thomas will speak up. When he did so
in the case about cross burning,
[i]t was a gripping made-for-television moment-except, of
course, for the fact that television cameras are not permitted
inside the courtroom. Justice Thomas speaks in a rich
baritone that is all the more striking for being heard only
rarely during the court's argument sessions. His
as the
intervention, consequently, was as • unexpected
. 57
passion with which he expressed his view.
Justice Thomas's intervention in that case appeared to be
more of a comment than a question:
Well, my fear is, Mr. Dreeben, that you're actually
understating the symbolism... and the effect of the cross,
the burning cross... [M]y fear is that the-there was no

other purpose to the cross. There was no communication of
a particular message. 58It was intended to cause fear and to
terrorize a population.
Because Justice Thomas asks so few questions (and in most
cases, asks none), it would be futile to employ my methodology
in an attempt to predict how he might decide a particular case.
On the other hand, it seems reasonable to conclude that, when he
does speak, Justice Thomas might be advocating as much as he
is adjudicating.
V. CONCLUSION

A. PreliminaryObservation
It has long been debated whether oral argument is useful
for the advocate or whether it just gives the Justices an
57. Linda Greenhouse, An Intense Attack by Justice Thomas on Cross-Burning, 151
N.Y. Times Al (Dec. 12, 2002).
58. Transcr. of Oral Argument at 23-24, Va. v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (available at
2002 WL 31838589).
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opportunity to advance their own points of view. I do not
pretend to have resolved that question. However, I hope that my
observations challenge the long-held belief that trying to predict
a Supreme Court decision is like trying to predict the World
Series-both exercises in futility. My research, limited though it
was, suggests to the contrary that an observer may be able to
predict simply by evaluating their questions how the Justices
will decide a particular case.
B. Predictions
In order to test my theory, I made predictions about the
three cases that had not been decided when I formulated my
theory, and in the following section, I compare my predictions to
59
the actual outcomes.
1. Predictionsand Result in Ayers
In Ayers, the Justices asked the respondent questions with
an overall score of 2.93, whereas the petitioner faced questions
with an average score of 3.71. This information by itself
suggested that the Court would hold for the respondent. I thus
predicted a decision in favor of the respondent, with possible
dissenters Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist, and Justice Breyer
the swing vote. Two Justices who appeared to be very much in
favor of the respondent were Justices Souter and Stevens, and if
the majority held for the petitioner instead, I predicted that they
would dissent. Justice Kennedy asked the respondent more
questions than he did the petitioner (which would normally
indicate an adverse position to the respondent), but his questions
were more helpful on average than they were hostile. Thus, I
predicted that Justice Kennedy might vote with Justices Souter
and Stevens in favor of the respondent.
Overall, my predictions for Ayers were reasonably
accurate. The majority did hold for the respondent, with Justices
Souter and Stevens joining Justice Ginsburg's opinion. I erred
with Justice Kennedy, who concurred in part, but dissented from
the majority's principal holding that a worker exposed to
59. These predictions do not factor in any outside knowledge about the Justices'
previous holdings on the issues of asbestos actions or California's three-strikes law.
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asbestos could recover for his fear of contracting cancer. The
Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor and Breyer joined his
opinion. Justice Breyer also filed an opinion concurring in part
and dissenting in part.
2. Predictions andResults in Ewing and Lockyer
In the California three-strikes cases, I predicted that the
Court would hold for the respondent in Ewing and the petitioner
in Lockyer, which would effectively mean upholding the threestrikes law. In Ewing, the Justices asked the respondent and
petitioner questions with average scores of 2.83 and 3.66,
respectively. In Lockyer, the Justices asked the respondent and
petitioner questions with average scores of 3.93 and 2.67,
respectively. My predictions, based on these numbers, were
correct.
Although my analysis turned out to be accurate in these
cases, I did face some uncertainty. In particular, while Justice
Ginsburg appeared to be leaning in favor of the petitioner in
Lockyer, as she asked almost three times as many questions of
the respondent, she actually joined Justice Souter's dissent in
favor of the respondent. Yet in Ewing, her questions indicated
that she was more in favor of the petitioner's position, and she
did in fact join the dissent in favor of the petitioner.
Also in Ewing, Justice Souter asked more questions of the
respondent, which according to my theory would indicate an
adverse position to that party; however, he was responsible for
the eventual dissent favoring the respondent's position. A close
look at the data, however, reveals that he asked questions more
hostile in content of the petitioner (with an average score of 4.0
versus 3.67 for the respondent). Thus, the content of Justice
Souter's questions, as opposed to the number of questions he
asked, would have been a good indicator in that case.
Overall, the remaining Justices proved quite predictable.
For example, in Ewing, Justice Scalia asked twice as many
questions of the petitioner as he did of the respondent, and he
also asked the petitioner questions that were 3.8 times as hostile.
Illustrating how my theory can work in application, Justice
Scalia wrote a concurrence in favor of the respondent. In
Lockyer, the Chief Justice asked the respondent 4.5 times the
number of questions that he asked the petitioner, and the
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questions were much more hostile (3.17 for the respondent
versus 2.50 for the petitioner). As these statistics led me to
predict, the Chief Justice joined the majority in favor of the
petitioner.
C. Summary
Of course with Justice Thomas rarely ever asking
questions, it is difficult to predict an outcome when the votes are
five to four. However, because Justice Thomas is rarely a swing
vote, his silence should not pose an obstacle in the majority of
cases. In the end, it seems that one can predict-with surprising
accuracy-a particular Justice's decision in a given case. And in
cases that seem very close, an additional way to ensure a
successful prediction is simply to look at the total number of
questions asked by all of the Justices. In every case that I
reviewed, the party facing the fewest questions was the ultimate
victor.
Lawyers preparing to argue in the Supreme Court may
wonder if this information can actually be useful, especially
considering the reality that the case is out of the lawyers' hands
once the questioning ends. But the answer is simple: Both sides
have a chance to see which points are troubling the Justices and
to address these issues before the argument is over. The
respondent hears how the Justices are reacting to the petitioner
during opening argument, and the petitioner is entitled to reserve
time for rebuttal. In theory, then, the lawyer for each side has the
opportunity to mold his or her answers accordingly.
This analysis brings me back to the original question: Do
the Justices use oral argument to play devil's advocate by posing
questions designed to elicit the strongest and weakest arguments
of each side, or do they use oral argument to do some advocacy
of their own? My limited research suggests that the answer is a
little of both. Many of the Justices pose hostile or argumentative
questions to both sides, but it seems that more often they go easy
on the lawyer for the party they support and only play devil's
advocate to the lawyer for the party they oppose. Essentially,
whether they do it by asking more questions or by asking
questions that are more hostile in content, the Justices simply
give the side they disagree with a harder time. And, regardless
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of whether the Justices actually intend to do their own
advocating, this information suggests that one might profitably
use an analysis of their questions to predict what was previously
thought to be unpredictable.

